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COMMENT
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES'
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
REGULATION: TWO-YEAR REVIEW
Since 1985,' the European Communities (EC) 2 has exper-
On July 14, 1985, the Commission of the European Communities published the
White Paper, which set forth a detailed timetable for legislative proposals to be adopted
by the Council of Ministers to achieve the EC objective of an integrated European Mar-
ket by 1992. COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET, WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, (COM 85) 310 Final at 3 (1985). By April 7, 1990, the Commis-
sion had submitted 282 proposals to the Council. To date, 147 proposals have been
adopted, and the remainder await Council consideration. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby &
MacRae, Countdown 1992, BUS. J. (June 1990).
' The European Communities (EC) was established under the Treaty of Rome,
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, reprinted in 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 161 (1973) [herinafter Treaty of Rome], to
strengthen the nations of Europe weakened by World War II. OFFICE OF PRESS AND PUB-
LIC AFFAIRS. DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES WASHING-
TON. D.C., THE EC IN THE UNITED STATES. Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and pro-
gressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ativities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
The Treaty incorporates three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) established on July 23,'1952, as well as the European Economic Community
(EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), both established in
1957. The EC is now comprised of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (LUXEM-
BOURG). EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS-COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET No. 3/1989, at
6 (1989). The common institutions and policies are shared by 345,000,000 people. Statis-
tical Office of the European Communities, RAPID REPORTS POPULATION AND SOCIAL
CONDITIONS (EUROSTAT 4) (1990). The EC is governed by four institutions: The Com-
mission, the Counsel of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice.
The Commission is responsible for administration and proposing legislation within the
community. The Council of Ministers is the decision-making body and enacts legislation
from Commission proposals. The European Parliament is elected by the citizens of the
12 EC Member States and has final approval over the EC budget. Its participation in the
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ienced a surge in the number of mergers and acquisitions (M &
A) among EC Member States.3 Among the top 1,000 EC compa-
nies," M & A activity rose from 227 transactions in 1985-86 to
492 transactions in 1988-89.1 The total disclosed figure6 of all
cross-border acquisitions of European companies in 1990, in-
cluding those of American and Japanese buyers, was approxi-
mately forty-eight billion ECUs,' or approximately sixty-two bil-
lion U.S. dollars.8 The total amount of expenditures by U.S.
firms on European cross-border aquisitions was approximately
ninety-two billion ECUs, or twelve billion U.S. dollars."
The surge of M & A activity in Europe has been attributed
to the 1992 "internal market" program objective of the EC,'0
and has affected United States-European economic relations."
EC decision-making process was recently increased. The Court of Justice is the EC "Su-
preme Court." It interprets EC law. Its rulings are binding. Emile, No6l, WORKING
TOGETHER-The institutions of the European Community (1988). See generally I THE
EUROPA WORLD Y.B. 1990 at 136-54 (1990).
' 1,000-Day Countdown Begins for 1992 as the Single Market Takes Shape, EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY NEWS, No. 16/90, Apr. 6, 1990.
4 Id. at 2.
1 Id.; see generally Richard Waters, International Mergers & Acquisitions, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at 23, col. 1.
' "Disclosed figure" are those figures released by companies. The figures do not re-
flect exact amounts for strategic purposes. Telephone Interview with Arnd Frohlich, Deal
Controller, World Deal Review (June 30, 1992).
' The ECU is the European Currency Unit, which functions in the European Mone-
tary System (EMS), established in March 1979, (1) to achieve internal and external sta-
bility in Europe, (2) to provide improved economic cooperation and growth among Mem-
ber States, and (3) to alleviate global monetary imbalances by spreading the impact of
excessive external monetary imbalances over all participant currencies. Commission of
European Communities, Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs, D-G Infor-
mation, Communication, & Culture, Belgium: The EMS: Ten Years of Progress in Euro-
pean Monetary Co-operation, 1990. The ECU has three primary functions: (1) it is a
common denominator for the exchange rates and intervention mechanisms; (2) it is the
basis for the "divergence indicator" (i.e., the central banks will intervene should a par-
ticipant currency appreciate or depreciate more than 2.25%); and (3) it is used as a
reserve instrument, as a denominator in the EMS credit mechanism, and as a means of
settlement for EC institutions. Ralph J. Mehnert, The ECU "For Beginners", EUROPE
Apr. 1989, at 20; see also COMMrrTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION,
REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989).
' Mark Dixon, World Deal Review 10-14 (Mark Dixon ed. & co.) (1991) (This figure
is an approximation for 1989 based on 1 ECU = U.S. $1.28.) Telephone Interview with
Arnd Frolich, Deal Controller, World Deal Review (June 30, 1992).
9 Id.
o For a detailed definition of internal market objective, see supra note 2.
" The EC is the largest United States trading partner with two-way trade totaling
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/13
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This is primarily because the surge of M & A activity has led to
a major restructuring of the European industrial landscape, al-
lowing Europe to secure a strong competitive position in the
world market.12 Consequently, this has created unique business
opportunities both for American businesses already present in
Europe and for the growing number of American businesses en-
tering the international market."3
The EC's response to this surge of merger activity began in
the 1970s with the EC Commission's increased awareness of the
necessity for an efficient competition policy as a means to pro-
vide "optimal allocation of resources and . . . to create the best
possible climate for fostering innovation and technical progress
in the unified market." 4 A Community-wide merger policy was
viewed as the means toward this end. 5 Three significant factors
supported that view. First, the possibility that mergers with mo-
nopolistic characteristics, resulting from the increase in merger
activity, posed a threat of damaging individual Member State's
competition activity and the overall functioning of the internal
market. 6 Second, the scope of the Commission's role in oversee-
ing merger activity under existing antitrust law, governed by Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, was undefined. 17 Third,
the Commission's power to prevent mergers that threatened the
Community was nonexistent under these articles.'" The lack of
uniformity between the national laws of individual EC Member
States and that of EC law created legal uncertainty for the par-
ties engaging in merger activity.'9
$161 billion in 1988. Companies within the EC and the United States are the largest
investors in each other's economies. The European Community J.Com., Jan. 12, 1990.
11 Guy de Jonquieres, A New Landscape Takes Shape, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1989, at
20, col. 3.
13 U.S. Firms Seek Foothold in Changing Europe, J. OF COM. June 21, 1989, at 5A,
col. 2.
" OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (LUXEMBOURG),
EEC COMPETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET, No. 1/1989, at 6 (1989).
m Id. at 7.
" Policing EC Mergers, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1989, at 20, col. 1.
" Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at arts. 85 & 86. For the full text of these two
Articles, see infra note 54.
18 AUDREY WINTER, EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE 169-73 (1989).
" Address by the Right Honourable Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the Com-
mission of the European Communities responsible for Competition Policy and Financial
Institutions to the EC Chambers of Commerce; New York (Mar. 26, 1990).
19921
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In 1973, the Commission responded to its competition pol-
icy deficiencies by submitting to the Council of Ministers the
first of four proposals for the adoption of a new European level
merger regulation.20 The objective behind these proposals was to
provide the EC Commission greater control over merger activity
and to demarcate spheres of responsibility between the Commis-
sion and Member States. This would confer upon one authority
the exclusive power to approve or to block a concentration,2' a
concept referred to as a "one-stop" merger control policy.22 The
policy would eliminate the inefficient two-tier level of govern-
ment scrutiny required before undertakings 23 enter into a
transaction.2"
These new proposals were met with resistance from Member
States who were hesitant to relinquish jurisdiction over merger
activity that was afforded them by their own domestic competi-
tion laws. 25 These domestic laws allowed Member States to exer-
cise merger control based on social and regional policy consider-
ations and to make determinations in light of their own national
interests.2 The conflicting political and economic objectives of
various Member States had hampered the Commission's efforts
to secure the Regulation's adoption.2 7 The Commission at-
tempted to expand its control over mergers through two Euro-
pean Court of Justice cases, Europemballage Corporation and
Continental Can Company v. EC Commission ("CONTINENTAL
20 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentration between Un-
dertakings, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1 (1973).
2 Id. A "concentration" is an EC term of art comparable to "merger." Patrick
Thieffry, et al. The Notification of Mergers Under the New EEC Merger Control Regu-
lation, 25 INT'L LAW. 615 (1991). For a definition under the Regulation, see infra note 99.
22 William Lee, EC 'Victory' On Merger Controls, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1990, at 7, col.
5.
23 An "undertaking" is an EC term of art comparable with "company." Thieffry,
supra note 21. For a definition under the Regulation, see infra note 100.
24 Lee, supra note 24.
25 Id.
26 European Commission, Press Release, IP (90) 156, Feb. 23, 1990; Steve Lohr,
Talking Deals: Guide to Future in Bid for Plessey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1989, at D2, col.
1. See also, Nancy Miller, US Executives Scan European Landscape For Takeover
Targets, J. oF COM., Apr. 10, 1989, at 2, col. 1; Dawkins, EC Merger Control Takes
Shape, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1989, at 4, col. 5.
2" Europe, Press Release, Internal Market Council: Differences Subsist Concerning
the Regulation on "Merger Controls", No. 5092, Sept. 18-19, 1989.
[Vol. 4:359
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CAN") 2 ' and the landmark case British American Tobacco Co.
LTD. & R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Commission ("Phillip
Morris"),9 under articles 85 and 86 respectively. Ultimately, it
was this attempt, despite the uncertainty surrounding these Ar-
ticles' true scope, that prompted the Member States to confer
formal merger control to the Commission.3 °
On December 21, 1989, after sixteen years of negotiations
and after three amended Council proposals, the Council of Min-
isters of the EC adopted the Merger Regulation to control M &
A activity.' The Regulation, formally known as the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations by Undertakings,
came into effect on September 21, 1990.32 The Regulation's main
feature is that it confers formal merger control on the Commu-
nity through a system of one-stop merger control. This allows
the Commission to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over mergers
whose size and nature, which are determined by a threshold de-
marcation system, make them of European-wide significance. 33
However, important qualifications to this basic demarcation ex-
ist within the Regulation. They reflect the conflicting objectives
expressed by Member States during the negotiations process
and illustrate the compromises of the Member States and the
Commission." Because of these qualifications the Regulation
has been criticized for failing to achieve a system of one-stop
merger control.3 5 As Commission case law decisions have been
rendered within nearly the first two years of the Regulation's
implementation, Member States have invoked these
exceptions.36
Such action by the Member States demonstrates that the
Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, Common Market Reporter (CCH) p. 8302, at 9481
[hereinafter Continental Can].
9 Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. 115, Common Mkt. Rptr. (CCH) p. 30
[hereinafter Philip Morris].
" Winter, supra note 18, at 174-75.
" European Commission, Press Release, IP (89) 1007, Dec. 21, 1989; Council Regu-
lation No. 4064/89, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L395) 1 (1989).
2 Id.
33 Id.
" Lee, supra note 22.
" Rice & Guy de Jonquieres, Uncharted obstacle course towards one-stop control
system, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
36 Andrew Hill & Peter Bruce, Brussels Imposes Strict Conditions on Mergers, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, at 22, col. 1.
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conflicting social, political, and economic objectives of each indi-
vidual Member State which existed prior to the adoption of the
Merger Regulation continue to play a role in attempting to cur-
tail the decision-making authority of the Commission under the
Merger Regulation.
Part I of this comment focuses on the history of EC compe-
tition law and of the legal and political constraints which led to
and molded the new Merger Regulation. Part II discusses the
significant features of the Regulation in light of the implement-
ing regulations issued by the Commission on July 25, 1990. Part
III highlights the exceptions to the Regulation that are said to
make it fail as a one-stop merger control. Part IV looks at how
the legal and political constraints which molded the regulation
have influenced the Commission's case law after nearly two
years of its implementation. Part V concludes that the excep-
tions under the Merger Regulation invoked by the Member
States reflect their diverse social, political and economic inter-
ests and demonstrate the friction between Commission advo-
cates of competition policy and promoters of industrial and in-
ternal market policy. Despite such pressures from Member
States the Commission must continue to make each determina-
tion on a competition basis. Only upon review of case law deter-
mined solely on competition grounds can a precedent be set that
will provide consistency and clarity for future application of the
merger rules in the EC under the Merger Regulation.
I. THE EEC MERGER REGULATION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
On March 25, 1957, the Treaty of Rome,37 which established
the European Communities, was signed. This treaty was com-
prised of three separate treaties: (1) The European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), 38 established in 1951, (2) the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC),39 established in 1957, and
(3) the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom),40 also
37 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2.
3' Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140.
39 Treat Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
40 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter Euratom].
[Vol. 4:359
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established in 1957.41 The Treaty of Rome's overall objective
was to strengthen Europe, weakened by World War II, through a
purely economic focus achieved by integration of European na-
tions.42 The specific objective of the EEC Treaty, as set out in
Article 2 of the treaty, was to eliminate restrictive practices
among Member States which impede competition or the comple-
tion of the internal market objective. 3
Traditionally, EC competition law, what United States law-
yers refer to as antitrust law, was governed by Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome." The EC Commission historically played
a significant role in the area of competition law. As the Commis-
sion became increasingly aware of the significance of attaining
an efficient competition policy, to achieve the common market
objective," the Commission sought to vet in advance or, if nec-
essary, to block certain large-scale mergers .4 A community-wide
merger policy was viewed as a means to that end.'7 There were
three significant factors that contributed to the Commission's
view. The first factor was the increase of merger and acquisition
activity in the EEC. The Commission welcomed this pheme-
nomenon. Thus, it allowed enterprises to compete on a global
scale because it viewed European level mergers as a means of
enhancing production and contributing to the competitive
framework of the market.48 However, the Commission feared
41 Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 1.
4" Office of Official Publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg: Europe
Without Frontiers-Completing the Internal Market No. 4/1989 at 9 (1989).
4' A. Winter, R. Sloan, G. Lehner, V. Ruiz, Europe Without Frontiers: A Lawyer's
Guide, Corporate Law Series (BNA ed. 1989). Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
4 Id.
" Office of Official Publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg: EEC
Competition Policy in the Single Market No. 1/1989 at 7 (1989).
41 W. Dawkins, EC Merger Control Take Shape, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1989, at 4, col.
5.
47 See supra note 43.
48 The Commission sponsored a report to show the effect of its competition policy in
the internal market. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa et al., Efficiency, Stability and Equity: a
Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community, Ox-
ford University Press, 1987.
1992]
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that the increase in merger activity would result in excessive
cartelization or in mergers that were monopolistic in nature cre-
ated by companies who would pursue size over sound business
logic.49 In turn, this would have a damaging effect on individual
Member States' competition activity and consequently have ad-
verse results for the functioning of the single market." There-
fore, the Commission attempted to attain the authority to inter-
vene more actively to vet in advance and, if it chose, to block
large-scale mergers that could distort or restrict competition
within the common market.5 "It is competition, above all else,
which fuels the engine of economic progress and our present and
future prosperity rests on the maintenance and improvement of
the competitive environment ir which we operate."52
The second factor which contributed to the Commission's
decision to increase its role in merger activity, was the undefined
scope of power given to the Commission to exercise merger con-
trol. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, the articles which
govern antitrust activity,53 do not confer the Commission with
formal merger control authority. These articles also do not pro-
vide the Commission with the power to block large-scale mergers
that might threaten the internal market objective. 4 Article 85
prohibits anti-competitive agreements, decisions, and concerted
pratices between enterprises that will remain independent enti-
49 Supra note 18.
50 Id.
51 Id.
82 Address by the Right Honorable Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities responsible for Competition Policy and Financial In-
stitutions to the EC Chambers of Commerce, New York (May 25, 1990).
" Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at arts. 85 & 86. Article 85(1) states in pertinent
part:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by undertakings of enterprises and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion whithin the common market ....
Article 86 provides in pertinent part:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the com-
mon market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. ...
14 A. Winter, R. Sloane, G. Lehner, V. Ruiz, supra note 44 at 169-173. See also,
Office of Official Publication of the European Communities, Luxembourg: EEC Competi-
tion Policy in the Single Market No. 1/1989 at 13, (1989).
[Vol. 4:359
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ties . 5 Article 85 has been routinely applied to joint ventures, not
mergers. A joint venture occurs when an enterprise is subject to
joint control by two or more undertakings that remain indepen-
dent entities.5 A merger, on the other hand, occurs when an en-
tity takes control over another to form a single economic unit.
57
Article 86 deals with companies that enjoy a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of that mar-
ket, and prohibits any abuse of such dominant position as in-
compatible with the common market.5 8 Therefore, Article 86
does not provide the Commission with the means to prevent mo-
nopolistic or oligopolistic situations, but does provide the means
to prevent any abuse of that status.5 9 Thus, because Articles 85
and 86 did not confer formal merger control powers on the Com-
mission, they could not provide a comprehensive code for merger
control.
The third factor which contributed to the Commission's po-
sition for the need for a merger regulation was the lack of legal
certainty created by non-uniform antitrust laws existing among
individual Member States and EC community law.60 For exam-
ple, while some Member States such as Germany and Britain
have sophisticated competition rules, others, such as Italy,6
have no national laws on antitrust activity.62 Consequently,
mergers were subject to a variety of national and community
rules that were applied in an arbitrary fashion, dependent on
industrial policy concerns. These concerns included regional or
social policy considerations that would benefit national interests
and were not based on strict competition. The result was that a
merger could be subject to parallel proceedings and double sanc-
55 Id.
86 Id.
57 Id.
88 Id.
59 Id.
80 Address by the Right Honorable Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities responsible for Competition Policy and Financial In-
stitutions to the EC Chambers of Commerce, New York (March 26, 1990).
' As of October 10th, 1991 Italy adopted its own national merger regulation which
is modeled on the EC merger regulation.
88 Barry E. Hawk, Europe's Try For a One-Stop Merger, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1990,
at sec. 3, p. 13, col. 2.
63 Id.
1992]
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tions under national laws and EC Community law under Articles
85 and 86.64 This two-tier level of merger scrutiny caused uncer-
tainty and led many enterprises to seek advice and clearance
from both national and EC competition authorities. 5 The delay
and expense of parallel investigations in an area where business
needed quick decisions based on well-defined rules made this
competition policy inefficient. 6 The Commission sought to ac-
quire more control of its merger policy because of the increase in
merger activity and the Commission's undefined role under Arti-
cles 85 and 86.
In 1973, the Commission responded to the deficiences of its
competition policy by submitting a proposal for new legislative
powers on the control of mergers to the Council of Ministers.6 7
Follow up amendments were submitted in 1981,68 1984,69 1986,0
1988,71 and 1989.7 In general, the proposals met with favorable
responses from the European Parliament, but failed to make any
progress within the Council of Ministers. This was because sev-
eral features of the regulation conflicted with the individual de-
mands of various Member States73 resulting in the failure of the
Council to adopt the 1989 proposal. 4 Three of the main conflicts
were: the threshold amount, rational review of a merger already
reviewed by the Commission, and the potential latitude availa-
ble to the Commission to determine the criteria by which merg-
ers should be judged.
First, a threshold level demarcation system was proposed by
the Commission as the means to delineate the size of mergers to
be policed by the Commission and those left to national authori-
14 Supra note 61.
65 Id.
66 Id.
07 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Un-
dertakings, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C/92) 1 (1973).
68 Proposal, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C36) 3 (1981).
00 Proposal, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C51) 8 (1984).
Proposal, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C324) 5 (1986).
Proposal, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C130) 4 (1988).
72 Proposal, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C22) 14 (1989).
73 Europe, Press Release, Internal Market Council: Differences Subsist Concerning
the Regulation on "Merger Controls". No. 5092. Sept. 18-19, 1989.
" See Andrew Fisher, Merger policy talks please German cartel-busters, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 3, col. 3; Jonathan Kapstein et al., Writing the New Rules for
Europe's Merger Game, BUSINESS WEEK, February 6, 1989, at 48.
[Vol. 4:359
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ties.75 The amount was set at five billion ECUs. Consequently,
the Commission would retain jurisdiction only over mergers with
a worldwide turnover of more than five billion ECUs. Contro-
versy arose among individual Member States on the amount. 6
Member States with highly evolved national competition laws
(such as the United Kingdom, West Germany and France)
pressed for a high threshold level of five billion ECUs which
would, in effect, decrease the number of mergers that would fall
under the Commission's jurisdiction and would result in more
mergers subject to national review.7 On the other hand, Mem-
ber States with little or no formal merger control laws of their
own (such as Italy,78 Portugal, Spain and the Benelux countries)
were willing to cede jurisdiction to the Commission and opted
for a lower threshold level of two billion ECUs.7 9 This lower fig-
ure would increase the number of mergers subject to the Com-
mission's review.80
Second, the Member States took issue with national review
of a merger already reviewed by the Commission. The Federal
Republic of Germany adamantly maintained the position that
national authorities should be allowed to review a merger that
fell under the Commission's jurisdiction." This position
stemmed from the reluctance of Member States with their own
sophisticated national merger laws, to yield control of national
sovereignty to the Commission. The Commission, however,
maintained that to allow such a demand would in effect frus-
trate the purpose of a one-stop merger concept, which was
designed to eliminate the two-tier level of merger review be-
tween the Commission and Member States.2
Third, the Member States objected to the potential latitude
available to the Commission to determine the criteria by which
mergers should be judged: The United Kingdom insisted that
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Supra note 63.
7 Supra note 62.
79 Id.
80 Supra note 18.
81 Supra note 74.
82 Id.
1992]
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competition should be the sole criteria for Commission rulings.8 3
However, Southern EC members, to wit, France and Italy,
wanted to include reference to wider market considerations such
as regional policy and social factors that would take into account
individual national industrial policy objectives.8
These conflicts hampered the adoption of the proposal sub-
mitted to the Council. In addition, they caused the Commission
to seek expansion of its authority under Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome, despite the uncertainty surrounding the true
scope of these articles, in two significant cases, Europemballage
Corp. v. EC Commission & Continental Can Comp. ("Continen-
tal Can")8" and British American Tobacco Co. & R.J. Reynolds
Industrial v. Commission ("Philip Morris")8
In the Continental Can decision of December 1971, the
Commission considered whether a merger between two compa-
nies could be considered a breach under Article 86.87 The Com-
mission held that if a company that is in a dominant position
acquires another company and thereby stengthens its market
position, the acquisition violates Article 86 as an abuse of a
dominant position.8 In 1973, the European Court of Justice up-
held the Commission's decision, confirming that if the result of
the acquisition by a dominant company is the reduction of com-
petition, the acquisition is an "abuse" of a dominant position. 9
The Commission also attempted to utilize Article 85, tradi-
tionally applied only to joint ventures, as a means of monitoring
mergers." In the Philip Morris case of 1987, the Commission
held that even the acqisition of a minority stake, may, under
certain circumstances, adversely affect competition within the
Common Market."1
Neither Articles 85 nor 86, despite the extensions estab-
lished in these two cases, provided a complete or comprehensive
83 Id.
84 Id.
11 Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, Common Market Reporter (CCH) 9481 (1973).
8 Joined cases 142 and 15/84, 1987 E.C.R. 115, Common Market Reporter (CCH) 30
(1987).
0' Supra note 85.
88 Id.
89 Id.
80 Supra note 86.
91 Id.
[Vol. 4:359
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code for merger control.2 In retrospect, the greatest significance
of these judgments lies in the pressure they brought to bear on
the Member States, to whom it became apparent that a formal
merger control regulation was preferable to the uncertain appli-
cation under Articles 85 and 86.
The Philip Morris case was decided on November 17, 1987
and it was the catalyst which ultimately led to the adoption of
the Regulation. The Commission's existing proposal was
amended and once more resubmitted to the Council with the
Commission stating its objective for the adoption by the end of
1988. Although this proved to be overly optimistic, it spurred
intensive discussion up until December 21, 1989 when, after six-
teen years of negotiations, the EC's new merger regulation was
adopted. 3
II. THE EEC MERGER REGULATION
On December 21, 1989, after sixteen years of deadlock, the
Council of Ministers adopted the Commission's proposal gov-
erning the control of M & A and created Council Regulation No.
4064/89. 9
A. The Purpose of the Regulation
The purpose of the Regulation is to create a one-stop
merger control system. This may be achieved by demarcating
the spheres of responsibility between the Commission and the
Member States. The authority to retain the exclusive power to
approve or block an undertaking from engaging in a large con-
centration would be delegated to the Commission. However, na-
tional authorities would apply their own national merger control
laws9" when smaller concentrations are attempted.
Under Article 3 of the Regulation, concentration refers to
full mergers, partial mergers, acquisitions and certain joint ven-
92 A. Winter, et al., supra note 44, at 169-173.
93 European Commission Press Memo: The Proposal Concerning Mergers and
Aquisitions, No. 3, Dec. 21, 1989.
1" Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC on the Control of Concentration Between Un-
tertakings. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L395) 1 (1989).
96 Id.
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tures 6 A "concentration" occurs when "(i) two or more [under-
takings] merge or (ii) one or more persons acquire, by any
means, control of the whole or part of one or more other [under-
takings]."97 Undertaking refers to any individual, group of indi-
viduals, or legal entity.98 When a majority of voting shares is ac-
quired by an undertaking, control is said to exist.99 Control may
also exist at or below fifty percent of the voting capital if, for
example, the rest of the shares remain widely dispersed. Addi-
tionally, control may be obtained by the purchase of assets, the
creation of contractual relationships, or any other means
whereby the possibilty of exercising influence over the decision-
making of an undertaking exists.100
B. The Scope of the Regulation
The Regulation delineates its jurisdictional scope by defin-
ing the category of applications to concentrations which have a
"Community dimension". 1 ' The term "Community dimension"
is defined by three criteria:
(i) aggregate worldwide sales of the parties exceeds 5 billion
ECU[s] ($6 billion), and (ii) each of at least two parties to the
transaction has sales within the EC greater than 250 million
ECU[s] ($300 million), unless (iii) each of the parties has more
than two-thirds of its Community sales within the same
[Miember [S]tates.' °2
The Community dimension threshold has been set at five
billion ECUs.'0 3 This is a relatively high threshold since the
Commission only retains jurisdiction over concentrations that
would create an undertaking with a worldwide turnover of more
than five billion ECUs. With the five billion ECU threshold, an
estimated forty to fifty deals a year will be subject to the Regu-
lation. In comparison, the two billion ECUs threshold would
. ABA Seminar: EEC Merger Regulation Draft Implementing Regulations and
Guidelines, Waldorf Astoria, New York, May 7, 1990.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Lee, supra note 24.
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have subjected an estimated 150 concentrations to Commission
scrutiny.'"" This issue was intensely debated during negotiations
among Member States." 5 Member States with existing domestic
merger control provisions were requesting higher limits. These
higher limits would decrease the number of mergers that fall
under Community level jurisdiction and increase the number of
transactions under national control. By contrast, countries which
had no domestic merger control legislation desired greater Com-
mission responsibility.'0 6
The position which has been adopted reflects a compromise
between the Commission and the Member States. The Regula-
tion provides for a revision of the threshold level by the end of
1993. 107 The Commission has already expressed its intention
that the threshold be lowered to the level of two billion ECUs,
with this and all future thresholds being subject to review based
on the Commission's application of the Regulation.'0 Future
threshold amounts shall be determined by the Council of Minis-
ters. In contrast to the unanimous decision which was required
for the adoption of the Regulation, only a qualified majority is
necessary for future changes in the threshold amount. 09
C. Procedures of the Commission under the Regulation
The Commission adopted implementing regulations nine
months prior to the date on which the Regulation was to go into
effect, September 21, 1990, in order to ensure smooth introduc-
tion and operation of the Regulation." 0 The following summa-
rizes the most significant portions of the Regulation in light of
these guidelines.
104 Id.
:0 Supra note 29.
06 Id.
107 Supra note 95.
108 Supra note 94.
109 Id.
I Commission Regulation No. 2367/90, On Notifications, Time-limits and hearings
provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89; 34 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L219)
(1990), Aug. 14, 1990.
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1. Notification
Once a transaction is determined to be of Community di-
mension and therefore subject to the Regulation, the enterprise
must notify the Commission (Article 4).'" The party acquiring a
controlling interest is required to submit notification on a pre-
scribed form.11 2 In cases of joint control, the parties must file
jointly, appoint a joint representative, and specify an address for
service in Brussels.1 1 3
The notification forms were circulated by the Commission
at the end of May 1990. " 4 Businesspersons and lawyers re-
sponded with hostility because they believed the form was com-
plicated, inflexible, and requested a quantity of information not
easily accessible. " 5 As a result, a simplified and less burdensome
form was created. " 6 In creating this new form, the Commission
attempted to strike a balance between its interest in obtaining
full information regarding a proposed concentration, and the in-
terest of industry in avoiding such burdensome disclosure proce-
dures.1 1 7 Thus the new form has not only been simplified but
now permits companies to ignore entire sections if they can
prove such sections are irrelevant to their proposed
concentration.'1 8
2. Timing
Time limits are important. Under Article 4(1) the Regula-
tion requires that notification be made within one week after ei-
ther the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the
public bid, or the acquisition of the controlling interest that
gives rise to the concentration. " 9 After notification, the Commis-
sion is required within one month to notify the undertakings
whether or not their proposed concentration falls under the Reg-
... Supra note 98.
112 Id.
113 Id.
.4 Supra note 112; European Commission Press Release IPn (90) 645 July 25, 1990.
I' Id.
" Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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ulation. 120 If the proposed concentration falls under the Regula-
tion, and the undertakings have been timely notified, the Com-
mission is then required, within four months, to decide whether
or not the proposed concentration actually violates the Regula-
tion.121 If the Commission does not comply with the above-speci-
fied time limits, the undertakings will not be bound by the
Regulation. 12
2
D. Criteria for Commission's Appraisal
The criteria for the Commission's evaluation of the pro-
posed concentrations was intensely debated among Member
States.12 Several Member States, most notably West Germany
and the United Kingdom,124 were insistent that the Commission
judge a merger solely on competition grounds.'25 Other Member
States, Spain, Portugal and France, 26 preferred that the Com-
mission include regional and social factors in making a
determination. 127
The position adopted by the Commission was that only
competition effects would be considered in evaluating proposed
concentrations. 128 Concentrations with a Community dimension
are incompatible with the Common Market when they create "a
dominant position as a result of which the maintenance or devel-
opment of effective competition would be significantly impeded
in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it" (Articles
2(2) and (3)).129 The Regulation sets forth specific criteria by
which the Commission is to determine the compatibility of a
concentration with the common market. 30 The Commission will
take into account a variety of considerations. These include the
structure of the market, the actual or potential competition from
1:0 Id.
21 Id.
121 Id.
"3 Supra note 29.
::4 Id.
15 Id.
1 Id.
127 Id.
128 Supra note 98.
:29 Lee, supra note 24.
30 Supra note 98.
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undertakings located within or outside the Community, the mar-
ket position of the parties involved, barriers to entry into the
market, the interests of the consumer, and the effects on techni-
cal and economic progress.' 1 These considerations give the
Commission great deal of discretion in evaluating the competi-
tive impact of a concentration. s
Thus, although the Commission claims to base its determi-
nation solely on competitive factors, its textual inclusion of
"technical and economic progress" as considerations, in reality,
allows the Commission to consider other factors.133
III. ONE STOP MERGER
The Regulation's most significant feature is to bestow for-
mal merger control on the Commission. It does this by granting
exclusive jurisdiction above a defined threshold to the Commis-
sion and below this threshold to the Member States.'" This sub-
jects a transaction to either the Commission's Merger Control
Regulation or to national law, but not to both.3 5 This is the
"one-stop shopping" concept. 36 However, the negotiating pro-
cess over the proposals submitted to the Council has resulted in
the erosion of this intentional demarcation of power between the
Commission and Member States. The Regulation contains three
exceptions to the principle of one-stop merger control.' The
first exception permits Member States intervention with respect
to a distinct market, the second permits Member States inter-
vention on the basis of their "legitimate interests", and the third
permits Commission intervention under the threshold at the in-
vitation of a Member State.13 8
... Lee, supra note 24.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
13 European Commission Press Memo, The Proposal Concerning Merger and
Aquisitions, No. 3, Dec. 21, 1989.
" European Commission, Press Release, IP (90) 156, Feb. 23, 1990.
"8 Sir Leon Brittan, Misplaced Doubts on EC Mergers, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1990, at
34, col. 1.
1 Id.
[Vol. 4:359
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/13
EC MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
1. The German Clause
The first exception is found under Article 9 of the Regula-
tion.1"9 It is referred to as the "German Clause"'140 because it was
formed at the insistance of West Germany"" which wanted its
national offices to investigate mergers that might threaten local
markets. ,2 Under this provision, the Commission has the option
either to address the case itself or to refer the case to the compe-
tant authority of the Member State." 3 The Commission may au-
thorize this national authority to investigate a merger above the
threshold, upon a Member State's request, based on the fact
that the transaction threatens to create or to strengthen a domi-
nant position in a distinct market.'" If the Commission con-
cludes that a distinct market does not exist in the Member
State, it will render its decision accordingly. The Member State
whose petition is overruled has the right to judicial review by
the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg."1
5
2. Legitimate Interest
The second exception is found under Article 21 of the Regu-
lation."16 It is referred to as the "public or legitimate interest"
exception because it allows Member States to intervene in con-
centrations of Community dimension on three grounds of legiti-
mate interest. 1 7 The first is "public security.""148 The Commis-
sion recognized that Member States, under Article 223 of the
Treaty of Rome, have a wide scope of reserved powers regarding
questions of national security."' The second specified ground is
"plurality of the media."'150 The Commission recognized that
139 Id.
140 Id.
.41 Europe, Press Release, INTERNAL MARKET COUNCIL: DIFFERENCES SUBSIST CON-
CERNING THE REGULATION ON MERGER CONTROLS, No. 5092, Sept. 18-19, 1990.
142 Id.
142 Id.
... Brittan, supra note 137.
145 Id.
146 Id.
247 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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Member States have a legitimate concern in preserving plurality
of media ownership. 1 1 The third is "prudential rules.' 15 The
Commission recognized Member States' interests in rules apply-
ing to the surveillance of financial institutions such as banks,
stockbrokerage firms and insurance companies. 6 3 If a Member
State wishes to rely on grounds other than those listed above, it
must first inform the Commission."" The limit to the "legiti-
mate interest" exception is that a Member State may not seek to
protect an interest related to competition. 55 This prevents a
Member State from intervening on industrial policy considera-
tions such as regional or social concerns.""6 Furthermore, only
cases in which the Commission concludes a concentration is in-
compatible with the Common Market can give rise to a Member
State's claim of incompatibility on "legitimate interest"
grounds." 7
3. The Dutch Clause
The third exception to the one-stop merger rule is found
under Article 22 of the Regulation. 6 8 It is referred to as the
"Dutch Clause"1 9 because it was formulated upon the insistance
of Member States with limited or inexistent national merger
control laws-states preferring a low threshold."' ° These states
included the Benelux States, 6 ' Italy," 2 Portugal, and Spain.'63
Under this provision a Member State may request that the
Commission intervene in a concentration which lacks a Commu-
nity dimension-one which threatens to create or strengthen a
"dominant position" that would significantly impede competi-
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
104 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
"0 Barry E. Hawk, Europe's Try for a One-stop Merger, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1990,
at sec. 3 p. 13, col. 2.
1561 Id.
565 Supra note 62.
565 Hawk, supra note 162.
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tion within the territory of that Member State. 6 The Commis-
sion must respond to these Member States within one month of
their application for review.' 65 The Commission's procedure in
such cases will be the same as its investigation of concentrations
above the threshold level.' 66
Criticisms of the Regulation for failure to achieve its princi-
ple goal of a one-stop merger control system has been founded
on the above exceptions. It is claimed that allowing a Member
State review of mergers with Community dimension on the basis
that the merger threatens a distinct market will lead to inconsis-
tency in Community decisions.'67 This is not consistent with the
express idea that the Regulation is to be the sole source of merg-
ers with Community dimension. " Additionally, to allow a Mem-
ber State to pursue a "legitimate interest" exception permits an
inquiry to be conducted parallel to a Commission investiga-
tion.169 This defeats the concept of allocating one sovereignty for
merger review.170 Finally, to allow the referral of a concentration
without a Community dimension to the Commission subjects the
merger to multiple control.'' Again, this frustrates the principle
of a one-stop merger control.1 2
In an effort to allay the confusion and uncertainty raised by
the suggestions of loopholes within the Regulation, Sir Leon
Brittan, Vice President of the Commission's Competition Policy,
made clarifying comments in the Financial Times in its Interna-
tional Capital Markets section on October 11, 1990.173 He repre-
sented the Commission's view that these exceptions are narrowly
circumscribed and do not constitute Regulation loopholes.' 7 '
First, the "distinct market" within its borders is not a loophole
because the Commission has two options which it may exercise
"I, Brittan, supra note 137.
165 Id.
166 Id.
,67 Prof. Am. Giorgio Bernini, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute
(Oct. 10, 1990).
168 Id.
16 I d.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Brittan, supra note 137.
174 Id.
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with regard to the application of national laws:17 5 (1) it may
agree a threat exists to competition, in which case it would re-
view the case under the Regulation without referral to national
authorities;17 or (2) it may find no threat exists based on a find-
ing that a relevant market is nonexistent in the national terri-
tory. 177 In this second situation, the Commission would inform
the Member State of the rejected application. This decision
would be final, subject solely to judicial review by the European
Court of Justice.1 78 The second exception which allows interven-
tion by a Member State for public or legitimate interest is not a
loophole to the Regulation's jurisdiction.17 9 It is necessary to al-
low the Member State some action because a merger may have
undesirable characteristics that affect a national market. This
action is not an exercise of competition law,180 and does not give
the Member State authority to stop any merger of which it may
disapprove.1 81 This exception effectuates a communication be-
tween the Commission and the Member State to make a claim
of public interest that is still governed under the Commission's
jurisdiction.18 2 The third and final exception to the general prin-
ciple of one-stop merger control, which allows a Member State
intervention based on a regional or national competition prob-
lem, is not a loophole to the Regulation's underlying principle of
single sovereignty to merger review.1 83 This exception does not
create double jeopardy or multiple jurisdiction. 84 It extends the
communication between the Commission and the Member State
to include cooperation between the two, and permits the Mem-
ber State to act as an advisory committee to the Commission
where the Member State's views in the area of competition may
be expressed. 186
178 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
116 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
184 Id.
1 Brittan, supra note 137.
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IV. THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Since the Merger Regulation came into force on September
21, 1990, the EC Commission has examined, approved, or denied
ninety-one proposed mergers as of June 1, 1992.111
Doubts of the EC Merger Control Task Force's ability to
review mergers under the Regulation's time constraints have
proved to be unfounded.""7 Under the Merger Regulation the
task force has a month from the time it is notified within which
to decide whether to clear a merger or to begin proceedings for
further inquiry, which may take a maximum of four months.1 88
To date, the task force's performance scrutinizing deals has
spurred only praise by trade and legal experts.1 80 However, some
skeptics point out that the lowering of the threshold demarca-
tion level as expected in 1993 will increase the Commission's
case load from about sixty notifications a year to 350-400, raising
the same doubts as to whether the task force will be able to deal
with these increased caseload numbers.1 90
Although the task force has managed to do an excellent job
with little controversy, the same cannot be said for the Merger
Regulation's case law which has come forth within the first year
and a half of the Regulation's implementation.""1
The friction between Commission advocates of competition
policy and promoters of industrial and internal market policy
which was prevalent during the adoption years of the Regulation
reappeared when the Commission first exercised its right of de-
nial of a proposed merger under the new Merger Regulation in
"" Commission of the European Communities, Christopher Matthews, Press officer,
approximate count as of June 1, 1992.
187 Andrew Hill, Brussels allows Tetra Pak link-up, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at 23,
col. 1; Andrew Hill & John Thornhill, Packaging Crusader Wraps up Merger Deal, FIN.
TIMES, May 24, at 23, col. 4.
' Supra note 122.
'9 Michael S. Lelyveld, EC Speeds Mergers but Doubts Remain, J. OF CoM., March
1991 at 1A.
390 Id.
381 Brian Love, EC Approval of Midland Bid Shows Trouble of Merger Control,
REUTER PRESS RELEASE, May 21, 1992.; Keith M. Rockwell, Cambridge Professor Slams
EC For Inadequate Merger Guidelines, J. OF COM., Jan. 10, 1992, at 2, col. 1.; Andrew
Hill & Paul Betts, Year-old Watchdog Bares its Fangs, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at 20,
col. 1.; Commissioners Call for Bigger say over Mergers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at 5,
col. 2.
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the Aerospatiale-Alena/de Havilland v. EC Commission case.'
In de Havilland,1 93 the EC Commission turned down the pro-
posed takeover of de Havilland, the financially troubled Cana-
dian aircraft manufacturer (and subsidiary of Boeing) by ART, a
joint venture between Aerospatiale of France and Alenia of It-
aly.194 The Commission reasoned that the proposed merger
would have given de Havilland and ATR fifty percent of the
world market and sixty percent of the EC market for commuter
aircraft. Commission analysis indicated that smaller competitors
in this market would not have been able to challenge ATR/de
Havilland either individually or collectively, considering the in-
dustry's current excess capacity, high investment costs, and mar-
ket uncertainty. 195
France and Italy raised objections to the Commission's deci-
sion. They argued that the Commission should base its decision
on industrial policy considerations and not solely competition
grounds.196
Since de Havilland, other Member States have also voiced
their concern of the Commision's new decision-making authority
under the Regulation. For example, German competition offi-
cials sought to review the proposed car battery merger between
Germany's Robert Bosch and Varta. They invoked an Article 9
exception of the Regulation which would give them review au-
thority of the proposed concentration on the grounds that the
deal affects a "distinct market" within a Member State.1 97 The
Commission refused to relinquish control of the inquiry to the
Bundeskartellamt (the German Federal Cartel Office).1 98 The
Commission retained sole jurisdiction over the proposed concen-
tration because it believed that this deal would give the parties a
'92 Andrew Hill & William Dawkins, Brussels Attacked Over Merger Policy, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at 5, col 1.
... Commission Decision Declaring the Incompatibility with the Common Market of
a Concentration, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland v. EC Commission, Case No. IV/
M.053 34 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L334) 42 (1991).
"' European Commission, Press Release, IP(91) 896, Oct. 2, 1991.
' Id.
1 Andrew Hill & William Dawkins, Brussels Attacked Over Merger Policy, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at 5, col 1.
'I Andrew Hill & Peter Bruce, Brussels Imposes Strict Conditions on Mergers, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, at 22, col. 1.
198 Id.
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large share of the replacement market for starter batteries in
Germany and Spain.199 On January 24, 1992 the U.K. govern-
ment followed Germany in invoking Article 9's "distinct market"
exception, requesting for the first time through Mr. Peter Lilley,
Britain's Trade and Industry Secretary, to allow the U.K. Office
of Fair Trading to review the proposed joint-venture of Steetley
(a clay roof-tile and concrete products business) with Tarmac (a
building materials group).200 This time the Commission agreed
and referred the Steetley Tarmac joint-venture back to the
United Kingdom.20 1 The Commission reasoned that, unlike the
German Bosch & Varta deal where German and Spanish mar-
kets were involved, here the concentration fell under the Article
9 exception affecting a "distinct market" within a Member
State, because here the markets were exclusively regional
ones.
202
The Member States' willingness to invoke the Merger Regu-
lations exceptions demonstrates a resurgence of voicing their de-
sire to have decisions made on policy grounds as they did before
the Merger Regulation was adopted. These attacks also highlight
the Member States' concern to curb the Commission's jurisdic-
tion over merger review. Some leading antitrust officials such as
Sir Sydney Lipworth, Chairman of the U.K. Monopolies &
Mergers Commission, and Rolph Geberth, head of competition
policy at the German Economics Ministry, believe that the EC
Commission is too susceptible to political influences to be the
ultimate arbiter of large EC mergers in an area where objectivity
in decision-making must be exercised.2 03 They have gone as far
as to suggest, particularly after such controversial decisions, re-
moval of the jurisdiction over mergers and acquisitions out of
the Commission's hands and the creation of an independent
mergers authority.204
Sir Leon Brittan on previous occassions has defended the
199 Id.
200 European Commission, Press Release, IP(92)45, Jan. 24, 1992.
0) Andrew Hill & Andrew Taylor, Brussels Refers Steetley Deal Back to UK, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992 at 5, col 1.
202 Id.
20' Brian Love, Top Cartel Officials Urge Independent EC Merger Control,
REUTERS PRESS RELEASE, June 16, 1992.
204 Id.
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EC's Merger Regulation and has expressed grave reservations
about the need for an independent European Mergers Author-
ity.205 At a Symposium of the Forschungsinstitut Wirtschaft-
sverfassung und Wettbewerb (Research Institute for Economic
Affairs and Competition) in Innsbruck, Austria, Sir Leon stated
that to date the Commission has resisted all political pressures
and has pursued a policy loyal to the Regulation and to the con-
cept of maintaining effective competition within its jurisdic-
tion.2 °0 Based on this performance, Sir Leon believes the case for
change has not yet been demonstrated.2 07
Furthermore, Sir Leon noted that the issues at stake in a
merger decision are not simply technical ones. There will always
remain an important element of judgment. 0 8 Therefore, pres-
sures would exist for an independent Mergers Authority just as
they do for the Commission at present. 09 The members of an
authority would be chosen from the Member States (like the
Commission's Merger Task Force) and would be subject to the
same national pressure as Commission members, thus frustrat-
ing the purpose of creating it.210
Sir Leon also pointed out that even the most enthusiastic
protagonists of a Merger Authority do not suggest that such an
authority should have the last word, and used Germany as an
example.21' Even the German competition authority, the ex-
tremely independent Bundeskartellamt, can be overruled. 12
While this may not be a problem in Germany, where commit-
ment to competition policy has been a reason for its post-war
prosperity, there is not a comparable commitment to competi-
tion policy in the EC-at-large.1 5
205 Id.
20 Address by the Right Honorable Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the Com-
mission of the European Communities responsible for Competition Policy and Financial
Institutions to the Forschungsinstitut Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wettberwerb in Inns-
bruck, Austria, "Do We Need a European Mergers Authority?", May 3, 1992.; Brittan
Defends EC Merger Regulation, EUROCOM Commission of the European Communities,
New York, N.Y., March 1992, at 2.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
%10 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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In terms of practical difficulties, Sir Leon stated that it took
sixteen years to achieve the current Merger Regulation: How
long would it take to reach a decision on an alternative
method? " ' And how long would it take to resolve the mundane
question of where that seat of any new authority should be?216
The European Environmental Agency, for example, has been
held up for almost two years on such an issue." 6
V. CONCLUSION
The internal market objective of the EC has spurred M&A
activity within the Community. The EC's Merger Regulation
seeks to remove uncertainties in merger control that have ex-
isted both within the Community Law and the laws of Member
States. The Regulation bestows formal merger control to the
Commission. This control was non-existent under Community
antitrust law governed by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. The purpose of the Regulation is to create one-stop
merger control. This is to be achieved by demarcating the
spheres of responsibility between large-scale mergers, of a Euro-
pean dimension, reserved for Commission review, and small-
scale mergers reserved for national review. However, there are
exceptions to the delineation of the Commission's jurisdictional
scope. These exceptions lead to overlapping of the Commission's
and the Member States' roles in merger review under specific
circumstances. Critics assert these exceptions could frustrate the
Regulation's main purpose: the creation of a one-stop merger
control policy. As the Commission's decisions have come forth
within the first year and a half, these exceptions have in fact
been invoked by individual Member States. The Member States
have begun voicing the very same reservations and concerns
which they expressed before the Regulation's adoption that re-
late to the retention of jurisdiction over proposed mergers with
strong social and industrial policy interests. Leading antitrust
officials have expressed a desire for a new authoritative body to
review concentrations. This demonstrates the growing debate
both within and outside the Commission between Commission
214 Id.
218 Id.
216 Id.
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advocates of competition policy and promoters of industrial and
internal market policy.
Since the Regulation has been in operation there has been
an in-depth investigation of only eight of the approximately
ninety-two proposed concentrations of which the Commission
has been notified. To date the Commission has only blocked the
de Havilland takeover. In addition, no Commission decision has
been appealed to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This is
significant because it means that the ECJ has not yet ruled on
any interpretations of the Commission case law under the
Merger Regulation. Such an objective review of EC merger pol-
icy would help to make it more transparent and predictable. In
light of these considerations it is important to realize that the
Commission's task has just begun in setting precedent and pro-
viding greater legal certainty. It is essential for the Commission
to continue obtaining concrete experience which comes through
the actual review of proposed mergers that fall under the Regu-
lation. The Commission task force to date has performed with
fairness and pragmatism. The Commission must continue the
close consultation which does exist between the Commission and
the national authorities to obtain an understanding between the
interests of Commission advocates of pure competition policy
and promoters of industrial and internal market policy. Only by
consistent application of the Merger Regulation on competition
grounds with light consideration of social and industrial policies
can the Commission hope to succeed in setting a precedent and
create consistency and greater clarity for legal and business
entities.
Luisa M. Cristofano
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